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PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION UNDER
THE 1980 COMPUTER AMENDMENT
J. Clark Kelso*
Alexandra Rebay**
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1980 Congress enacted legislation amending the Copy-
right Act of 1976 so as to extend federal statutory copyright
protection to computer programs.' The status of computer
programs under the copyright laws had long been a subject of
debate among computer industry representatives, the Copy-
right Office of the United States, Congress, and many com-
mentators.2 Now, with the enactment of the 1980 Amend-
ment, the principal issues involve questions of statutory
interpretation. The courts have accordingly become the main
forum for this debate.'
In any copyright action, the plaintiff must prove owner-
ship of a valid copyright in the work whose infringement is
alleged and copying of the work by the defendant.4 If the
plaintiff's proof is sufficient, the defendant will be found liable
o 1983 by J. Clark Kelso and Alexandra Rebay
* J.D., 1983, Columbia Law School. Research Assistant to the Dean, McGeorge
School of Law.
** J.D., 1984, Columbia Law School.
1. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3028 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Amendment].
2. The writings in this area are voluminous. Much of the material, however, has
become obsolete in light of the amendments to the copyright law discussed in this
article and the Supreme Court's recent patent decisions. See infra text accompanying
notes 26-34. A bibliography of patent-related works appears in Scott, Bibliography, 1
COMPUTER L.J. 233 (1978). For references to computers and copyright, see TECHNOL-
OGY & COPYRIGHT (G. Bush & R. Dreyfuss eds. 1979) and TECHNOLOGY & COPYRIGHT
(G. Bush ed. 1972).
3. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l.,Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir.
1984); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct 690 (1984); Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int'l.,
Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); Data Cash Sys. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp
1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979), affd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
4. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01 (1982).
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unless an affirmative defense, such as fair use, is shown.5 Each
of these three requirements for a successful copyright action
presents distinct problems when applied to computer pro-
grams as provided by the 1980 Amendment.
The first requirement, ownership of a valid copyright, in-
volves, among other things, a finding that the subject matter
of the work is copyrightable.6 The three main issues of
copyrightability of software currently facing the courts are
discussed in this article. The first issue is, do computer pro-
grams lose copyright protection when they move from one
physical manifestation to another (for example, from paper to
machine, or from punch cards to tape to disk)? Second, do
computer programs lose copyright protection when they are
translated from source into assembly language and then into
object code? Third, what is the relationship between copy-
right protection and patent protection, and should the possi-
bility of patentability preclude copyrightability?
The second requirement, copying by the defendant, is
usually satisfied by the factual finding of access plus "sub-
stantial similarity."'7 This article proposes a functional and
objective definition of "substantial similarity" that would fur-
ther the objectives that led to passage of the 1980
Amendment.
The third requirement concerns the absence of an affirm-
ative defense. The most common substantive affirmative de-
fense is the "fair use" of the copyrighted material.' The 1980
Amendment supplements the fair use provision of the 1976
Act. This article provides an interpretation of the new statu-
tory language.
We take as our central thesis the proposition that the
1980 Amendment is intended to redress the economic imbal-
5. Id. at § 13.05.
6. Nimmer lists the following elements as sufficient to show ownership of the
copyright by the plaintiff:
(1) Originality in the author, (2) copyrightability of the subject matter,
(3) citizenship status of the author such as to permit a claim of copy-
right, (4) compliance with applicable statutory formalities, and (5) (if
plaintiff is not the author) a transfer of rights or other relationship be-
tween the author and the plaintiff so as to constitute the plaintiff the
valid copyright claimant.
Id. at § 13.01[A]. Copyrightability of the subject matter is the only area where serious
questions have been raised concerning computer programs.
7. Id. at § 13.01[B].
8. Id. at § 13.05.
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ance and unfairness that would result if computer programs
were not protected by copyright. This proposition, combined
with the duty of courts to effectuate congressional intent, im-
plies that judicial interpretations that upset the balance by
denying copyright protection in cases where it is economically
necessary or by expanding copyright protection beyond the
point at which it is economically necessary, should be avoided.
In this way, court decisions may protect the legitimate eco-
nomic interests of the copyright owner without unduly harm-
ing society's interest in the widespread distribution of ideas.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1980 AMENDMENT
Copyright law was recodified by the Copyright Act of
1976.1 At that time, however, Congress was unable to decide
how to treat copyright in relation to computer software and
databases. Congress had created, in 1974, the National Com-
mission on New Technological Use of Copyrighted Works
[hereinafter the Commission] to study and make recommen-
dations concerning, among other things, the "use of copy-
righted works of authorship ... in conjunction with auto-
matic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, and
transferring information." 10 Pending the Commission's recom-
mendations, Congress froze the copyright law as it pertained
to computer uses of copyrighted works as of December 31,
1977.11
The Commission issued its Final Report on July 31,
1978,12 recommending that the copyright law be amended to
9. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-801 (1976)) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Copyright Act].
10. Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974) (creating the Commission).
11. Section 117 of the 1976 Copyright Act provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 through 116 and 118,
this title does not afford to the owner of copyright in a work any greater
or lesser rights with respect to the use of the work in conjunction with
automatic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, or transfer-
ring information, or in conjunction with any similar device, machine, or
process, than those afforded to works under the law, whether title 17 or
the common law or statutes of a State, in effect on December 31, 1977,
as held applicable and construed by a court in an action brought under
this title.
The 1976 Copyright Act became effective on January 1, 1978. See 17 U.S.C. §§
301-303. Two courts have had the opportunity to interpret section 117. See infra text
accompanying notes 56-63.
12. See Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses
19831 1003
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reflect copyright protection of computer software. In support
of its conclusion that copyright protection should be extended
to computer programs, the Commission made three findings:
(1) to encourage the creation and dissemination of computer
programs, it is necessary to give program authors some form
of legal protection;' 3 (2) means of protection other than copy-
right are ineffectual or impose too high a cost on society;" and
(3) copyright will provide sufficient protection for the author
without unduly restricting public access to computer
programs."5
Congress, in the 1980 Amendment, adopted the Commis-
sion's recommendations for new legislation with only one
change in statutory language and without significant com-
ment.' 6 Because the Commission was a creation of Congress
of Copyrighted Words, (Library of Congress 1979) [hereinafter cited as Final Report]
reprinted in significant part in 3 COMPUTER L.J. 53 (1981).
13. Final Report, supra note 12, at 11.
14. Id. at 16-23.
15. Id. at 12.
16. The following was added at the end of section 101 of the 1976 Copyright
Act: "A 'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly
or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(Supp. IV 1980). Section 117 was amended to read:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement
for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the
making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program
provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential
step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a
machine and that it is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only
and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued
possession of the computer program should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this
section may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the
copy from which such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease,
sale, or other transfer of all rights in the program. Adaptations so pre-
pared may be transferred only with the authorization of the copyright
owner.
17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1980). The language of the Congressional amendment ap-
pears in the Final Report, supra note 12, at 12.
The Commission's version of section 117 applied to "the rightful possessor" of a
copy of a computer program, Id., while section 117 as passed by Congress applies only
to "the owner" of a copy of a computer program. Given this change in language, it
seems likely that courts will interpret the word "owner" narrowly. In particular, les-
sees will probably not be covered by section 117, and their right to copy or adapt a
program will be governed by the terms of the lease rather than by the copyright law.
Thus, a copyright owner apparently can maintain much greater control over use of a
program by leasing it instead of selling it.
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charged with suggesting statutory amendments, and because
Congress adopted the Commission's suggestions, the legisla-
tive history of the 1980 Amendment is most appropriately
found in the work of the Commission.1 7
This article strives to conform to the following guidelines
for statutory interpretation:
The goal of interpretation is to determine the meaning of
a statute's words by asking what they would mean to a
reasonable person familiar with the objective context of
the statute, including the mischief it was designed to rem-
edy, the temper of the times, and most importantly, the
statute's purpose, derived in part from the statute's legis-
lative history.18
In accordance with these guidelines, we first examine the find-
ings of the Commission in order to determine the "mischief"
the Commission believed existed and how the Commission
thought that mischief could best be remedied.
17. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 524-25
(9th Cir. 1984); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
1247-54 (3d Cir. 1983), cert dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984).
18. R. KELSO & C. KELSO, STUDYING LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 256 (West 1984).
The quotation describes the Holmesian or classical method of interpretation. A chal-
lenge to this method, according to Kelso and Kelso, was presented in the 1940's and
50's with the rise of Instrumentalism:
The instrumentalist goal of interpretation is to find the legislature's in-
tent in order to carry out its purpose. The words of a statute are the
starting point for evidence of intent and purpose. But words don't have
fixed meanings and therefore all relevant evidence, including legislative
history, should be considered to discover the intent and purpose of the
legislature. A court should also strive to interpret the statute to reach a
fair or sensible result.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline of
Method, 3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 333 (1975). The major difficulty with the instrumentalist
approach is that, although it
puts the most evidence into the hands of the court ... it allows great
weight to be given to the court's inference of legislative purpose, and
that inference may be rather distant from the statute's actual words.
There is a real possibility that a judge's own notions of policy may be-
come enmeshed in conclusions on what the legislature intended.
R. KELSO & C. KELSO, supra at 256. This tendency may be especially pernicious with
regard to economic and business regulation where stability and certainty are impor-
tant factors, as opposed to social regulation where goals of fairness and justice play a
larger role. Copyright protection falls into the class of economic and business regula-
tion and, therefore, the Holmesian approach is the more suitable guide to
interpretation.
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A. The Necessity of Legal Protection for Software
Based on its study of the economics of the computer
software market, the Commission first found that in order to
encourage the creation and dissemination of computer pro-
grams, authors must be given some form of legal protection. 9
The Commission found that the computer software industry
has high development costs (i.e., high fixed costs) but low
marginal costs.2 0 Thus, the cost of producing the first program
is high while the cost of duplicating that program for future
sales is relatively low.2 In this type of market, the price of a
commodity to consumers cannot be based on marginal costs
but must, instead, be based on average cost.2 Computer pro-
grams, therefore, require legal protection since software "pi-
rates" could obtain significant competitive advantage by
purchasing a developer's software on the open market, repro-
ducing it for general distribution, and then selling them in di-
rect competition with the developer at drastically lower prices.
To illustrate the point, assume that computer programs
have no legal protection and that marginal costs are zero. 3
Company A writes a computer program at a cost of $100,000.
It anticipates sales of 1,000 programs over the next several
years. In order to break even, A sets a price of $100 for
purchase of one copy of the program (that is, the average cost
per unit). Suppose that company B buys a copy of the pro-
19. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AS APPLIED TO COMPUTER SorwARE AND DATA BASES,
(1977) [hereinafter ECONOMIC REPORT).
20. See ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 19, at 11-10 to 11-12. The Commission
looked at the development costs of only one computer system. They found that fixed
costs accounted for approximately 25% of the total cost of the system. The Commis-
sion included the cost of hardware acquisition in the total cost. Hardware acquisition
amounted to 60-70% of total costs. A software vendor might not have significant
hardware costs, and thus, in some cases, the fixed costs will be a much higher propor-
tion of total costs.
21. See Final Report, supra note 12, at 11: "The cost of developing computer
programs is far greater than the cost of their duplication."
22. See ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 19, at 11-2 to 11-4. The ECONOMIC REPORT
assumes that the price of a computer program will remain the same during its useful
life. In a real market, this assumption may not hold, and the price will drop as a
program becomes outdated. In such circumstances, the seller would presumably set
the price higher at initial release than average cost would require so as to compensate
for the fact that the program may steadily decrease in value.
23. In the example in the text, the marginal costs for both firms should be
nearly the same. Thus, it does not affect the validity of the example to assume zero
marginal costs.
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gram. B's total cost is $100 while A's cost was $100,000. B ob-
viously can cut into A's market by cutting the price. B is reap-
ing the benefits originally sown by A. In order to encourage
the development and dissemination of programs, some form of
legal protection is needed.2'
B. The Inadequacy of Current Law
The Commission's second finding was that means of pro-
tection other than copyright are insufficient. The major legal
doctrines which might provide suitable protection are patent
law, trade secrecy and unfair competition. 5
1. Patent Law
At the time the Commission made its report, the use of
patents to protect computer programs seemed a dim prospect.
The Supreme Court had on three occasions ruled against the
existence of a patent in a computer program. 2 Furthermore,
the Commission was concerned that the difficulty and expense
of obtaining a patent would preclude widespread use of patent
as a tool to protect computer software2 7 The contours of pat-
ent law have been changed, however, by the Court's holdings
in Diamond v. Diehr28 and Diamond v. Bradley.29 In Diehr, a
patent was granted for a computer controlled process of trans-
forming raw uncured rubber into cured rubber.30 In Bradley
24. Another solution would be for a third party, e.g., the U.S. Government, to
subsidize program development. Such subsidy will hardly be forthcoming given cur-
rent political and economic realities. See Final Report, supra note 12, at 11.
2. See id. at 16-23.
26. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Dann v. Jonston, 425 U.S. 219
(1976); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
27. Final Report supra note 12, at 17:
The acquisition of a patent ... is time consuming and expensive, pri-
marily because a patentee's rights are great and the legal hurdles an
applicant must overcome are high. A work must be useful, novel, and
nonobvious to those familiar with the state of the art in which the pat-
ent is sought.
28. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
29. 450 U.S. 381 (1981).
30. The Supreme Court described the patent as follows:
The process uses a mold for precisely shaping the uncured material
under heat and pressure and then curing the synthetic rubber in the
mold so that the product will retain its shape and be functionally opera-
tive after the molding is completed .... It is possible using well-known
time, temperature, and cure relationships to calculate by means of the
Arrhenius equation when to open the press and remove the cured prod-
1.983] 1007
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an equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the grant of a pat-
ent in a firmware program and related hardware elements that
gave other computer programs access to otherwise inaccessible
scratchpad registers.3 1 Nelson Moskowitz has described the
new rule of the Patent and Trademark Office in cases follow-
uct. . . . Respondents characterize their contribution to the art to re-
side in the process of constantly measuring the actual temperature in-
side the mold. These temperature measurements are then automatically
fed into a computer which repeatedly recalculates the cure time by use
of the Arrhenius equation. When the recalculated time equals the actual
time that has elapsed since the press was closed, the computer signals a
device to open the press. According to the respondents, the continuous
measuring of the temperature inside the mold cavity, the feeding of this
information to a digital computer which constantly recalculates the cure
time, and the signaling by the computer to open the press, are all new in
the art.
Id. at 177-79.
The case seems to hold only that the use of a computer program in an otherwise
patentable process does not transform the process into unpatentable subject matter:
"Obviously, one does not need a 'computer' to cure natural or synthetic rubber, but if
the computer use incorporated in the process patent significantly lessens the possib-
lility of 'overcuring' or 'undercuring,' the process as a whole does not thereby become
unpatentable subject matter." Id. at 187.
31. Chief Justice Burger took no part in the decision. The circuit court reversed
the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals' denial of a patent application in
the following invention:
Appellants' invention is in the field of computer technology. It does not
relate to computer applications, i.e., any specific task that a computer is
asked to perform, but rather to the internal operation of the computer
and its ability to manage efficiently its operation in a multiprogrammed
format. A multiprogrammed format is one in which the computer is ca-
pable of executing more than one program, and thus perform [sic] more
than one application at the same time, without the need to reprogram
the computer for each task it must perform.
Specifically, the invention relates to altering or repositioning infor-
mation in the computer's system base . ... Prior art systems altered
the system base information resident in the scratchpad registers by ei-
ther reinitializing the system base (completely new information), a pro-
cess which consumes a considerable amount of time, or by using
software which takes advantage of the model-dependent properties of
the particular computer. The latter method has the undesirable effect of
resorting to reliance on model-dependent software, which is unaccept-
able to some computer users.
Appellants' invention enables system base information to be altered
without having to resort to these techniques and their accompanying
drawbacks. They accomplish their result by employing a "firmware"
module, consisting of hardware elements permanently programmed with
a microcode, which directs the data transfers, between the scratchpad
registers and the system base located in main memory, which are neces-
sary to effect the alteration.
In re Application of Bradley, 600 F.2d 807, 808-09 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
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ing Diehr and Bradley:
The claims [are] first analyzed to determine if they [re-
cite] nonstatutory mathematical algorithms as defined in
[Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972)]. Claimed in-
ventions not containing such algorithms [are] found to be
within the statutory categories of invention. If the claims
[are] found to recite mathematical algorithms, the claims
[are] then considered as a whole to determine if the al-
gorithm [transforms] at least one element of the inven-
tion to a different state or thing. If such a transformation
[takes] place, the claims [are] considered to be within the
statutory categories of invention.32
It is clear from the above statement that patent law will
provide protection for only a portion of all computer pro-
grams. The protection, however, would seem to include an ec-
onomically important group of programs - those which con-
trol machine elements in industrial processes.33 Nevertheless,
this change in patent law does not significantly undermine the
Commission's finding, since patents for many computer pro-
grams will be impossible to obtain under the new test. More-
over, the patent requirements of novelty, usefulness, and non-
obviousness remain intact,3 4 and acquisition of a patent is still
time-consuming and expensive.
32. Moskowitz, The Patentability of Software Related Inventions After Diehr
and Bradley, 63 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 222, 230 (1981).
33. Patent protection for these types of computer programs would complement
Nimmer's view of what copyright law should protect. As discussed more fully below,
see infra text accompanying notes 87-94, Nimmer suggests that copyright should pro-
tect only those programs which produce copyrightable output. Under the current pat-
ent law, however, such programs might be adequately protected. The patent in such
cases would protect not the computer program by itself, but, rather, the whole inven-
tion, i.e., the program plus the other elements of the invention that the program con-
trols. Thus, the patent would not prevent someone from taking the program and us-
ing it to control a different set of elements. Such use is, however, most unlikely, since
the computer programs which perform these types of functions are usually tailor-
made for the particular invention. Therefore, most programs would not be easily
adaptable to another environment, and the patent in the whole invention would serve
to protect the program itself. It is interesting to speculate what the Commission
would have done if it had had the Supreme Court's decisions before it. It may well be
that the Commission would have agreed with Commissioner Nimmer in his concur-
rence that copyright is not the appropriate means to protect computer programs
which do not produce copyrightable output.
34. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (1976).
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2. Trade Secrecy
The Commission found that although trade secrecy is
available for more programs than are patents, s5 trade secrecy
imposes too high a cost on society. Maintaining secrecy adds
costs to the process of writing computer programs.3 6 There is
also a cost to society in the duplication of effort among com-
petitors.3 7 Further, since a trade secret may be lost by disclos-
ure or reverse engineering, the price to consumers will be
higher so as to insure against the possibility of the loss of the
secret. Finally, trade secrecy is probably not available for pro-
grams designed for mass distribution (for example, computer
games).38 The issue of whether copyright law preempts trade
secret law remains unsettled. 9
3. Unfair Competition
A third possible source of protection is unfair competi-
35. The subject matter of trade secrets is broader than patent subject matter,
and the requirements for securing trade secret protection are easier to satisfy than
requirements for securing a patent. The subject matter of a trade secret is described
as follows:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compila-
tion of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him
[sic] an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not
know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a process
of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a ma-
chine or other device, or a list of customers.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939). The only other requirements are
secrecy and novelty. The novelty requirement is less strict than that imposed in pat-
ent law, but more strict than the originality requirement imposed in copyright law.
See generally Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
909 (1970).
36. For example, comments in the source code are omitted to make it more
difficult to understand the program; incorrect comments may be added to mislead;
the program may be made needlessly complex; nonsensical variable names may be
used; or unnecessary lines of source may be added. All of these devices increase costs
by increasing complexity and decreasing readability. See ECONOMIC REPORT, supra
note 19, at 111-5.
37. See id. at 111-14.
38. See Final Report, supra note 12, at 17.
39. Compare Management Science America, Inc. v. Cyborg Systems, Inc., 6
COMPUTER L. SERV. Rep. 921, 926 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (dicta that state trade secret law
was not preempted by federal copyright law in case involving marketing of computer
program with a copyright notice under a trade secret license) with Avco Corp. v. Pre-
cision Air Parts, Inc., PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) No. 496 at A-1 (1980)
(action for misappropriation of trade secrets in drawings and specifications pre-
empted by federal copyright law). A bill has been introduced settling the issue in
favor of non-preemption. H. R. 6983, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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tion, including the tort of misappropriation. 0 Although there
is some federal protection under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Trademark Act of 1946,"' unfair competition is primarily a
creation of state statutory and common law. Misappropriation
is broadly defined. It generally requires proof of three
elements:
(i) the creation of plaintiff's product through extensive
time, labor, skill and money, (ii) the defendant's use of
that product in competition with the plaintiff, thereby
gaining a special advantage in that competition (i.e., a
"free ride") because defendant is burdened with little or
none of the expense incurred by the plaintiff, and (iii)
commercial damage to the plaintiff."
This tort would seem to cover most of the evils contem-
plated by the Commission. The tort was, however, summarily
rejected by the Commission as insufficient to the task. s The
question now is whether the Copyright Act has preempted
misappropriation law with respect to computer programs. The
Commission wrote that "unfair competition may provide relief
ancillary to copyright in certain situations,"" but it is far
from clear that the Commission's belief will become law. In-
deed, one court has already declared that the Copyright Act
40. See Final Report, supra note 12, at 18.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1976). A broad reading of the Lanham Act making it
nearly co-extensive with state unfair competition law was made in L'Aiglon Apparel,
Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3d Cir. 1954). See generally, Allison, Private
Cause of Action for Unfair Competition Under the Lanham Act, 14 Am. Bus. L.J. 1
(1976) (discussion of L'Aiglon Apparel).
42. Dannay, The Sears-Compco Doctrine Today: Trademarks and Unfair Com-
petition, 67 TRADE-MARK REP. 132, 134 (1977).
43. The Commission wrote of unfair competition that "its scope is not as broad
[as copyright's], and it seems unlikely that it alone could provide sufficient protection
against the misappropriation of programs. For example, the unauthorized copying of
any work for any purpose could be a copyright infringement without amounting to
unfair competition." Final Report, supra note 12, at 18. The difficulty with the Com-
mission's argument is that it assumes that copyright should be extended to all com-
puter programs, regardless of a program's economic importance to the author. This
assumption is not warranted and is inconsistent with the economic rationale support-
ing the extension of copyright to computer programs. See supra text accompanying
notes 19-24.
The Commission was also concerned that since unfair competition law is largely a
state doctrine, there is no national uniformity. See Final Report, supra note 12, at 18.
44. Final Report, supra note 12, at 18. The Commission does not specify in
what fashion such relief would be "ancillary" to that provided by the copyright laws.
Perhaps the word means simply that a claim for unfair competition could be joined to
a claim for copyright infringement.
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does preempt misappropriation."
C. The Adequacy of Copyright
The Commission found that, on balance, copyright is the
proper mechanism to protect computer programs. 6 Copyright
is applicable to virtually all programs and is well suited to
mass distribution of programs. Further, copyrights are more
easily enforced than patents. Finally, copyrights give protec-
tion to the owner without denying the opportunity for others
to use and benefit from the owner's work.
It is not clear, however, that copyright in its present form
will be sufficient. Commissioner Hersey observes, in his dis-
sent to the Final Report, that the uncertainties which remain
in the copyright law might drive computer programmers into
greater use of trade secrecy.4 7 Further, since copyright does
not protect the ideas of the author, it may not be appropriate
for many computer programs.48 Often, much of the value of a
program derives from a new idea and not from its particular
expression. Despite this limitation, however, copyright is a
45. Compare Synercom Technology v. University Computing, 474 F. Supp. 37
(N.D. Tex. 1979) (program which was not protectable under copyright law could not
be protected by state misappropriation law) with Roy Export Co. v. CBS, Inc., 503 F.
Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 60 (1982) (unfair competition claim not preempted by copyright law where state
law protects against commercial immorality and bad faith).
46. The advantages and disadvantages of each of the possible legal theories are
displayed in a chart which appears in the Final Report, supra note 12, at 19.
47. See id. at 34. Commissioner Hersey also argues that evidence of pre-1976
practice indicates that the computer industry has opted overwhelmingly for trade se-
cret protection rather than for the available copyright protection. Hersey's concern is
that this state of affairs will continue. The addition of copyright protection will only
tighten an author's grip on a program. It will not induce authors, despite the in-
creased security from piracy that copyright presumably provides, to disperse their
programs more widely within the computer industry. Thus, the goal of increased com-
munication among computer programmers and increased dissemination of programs
will not be realized.
Commissioner Hersey's reliance on pre-1976 evidence is, of course, misplaced.
The uncertainties remaining in the copyright law as it pertains to computer programs
pale in comparison to the state of the law before the 1976 Copyright Act. See infra
text accompanying notes 52 & 70. Hersey's predictions concerning future behavior
may ultimately prove prescient. However, the issue should not be prejudged. The
difference in cost between securing trade secret protection and securing copyright
protection may be large enough to cause cost-conscious businesspeople and program-
mers to opt for the less expensive form of legal protection.
48. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), which provides that copyright protection does not
extend to ideas, procedures, processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts, prin-
ciples, or discoveries.
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welcome addition to the protections available to a program
author.
III. THE COPYRIGHTABILITY OF SOFTWARE
In order to understand the impact of the changes in the
copyright law, some understanding of the following mechanics
of writing and using a computer program is necessary. In its
earliest states, a program may be in the form of a flow chart.
Alternatively, it may initially be written on paper in a com-
puter language, such as Fortran, Cobol, or Basic. More com-
monly, a program is typed onto punch cards which are reada-
ble by a Computer or typed directly into a computer and
stored on either tape or permanent disks. The program in this
initial form is usually called the "source."4 The next stage
typically involves having the computer "compile" the source.
The result of compiling is that the source code is translated
into a condensed form which the computer may execute more
quickly than it would if it had to read the source code while
running the program at the same time. The compiled code is
usually represented as a series of numbers. This compiled
code may be stored in short term memory, on tapes, on disks,
or in read only memories (ROMs). This form of a program is
called the "object" code. Both source and object code may be
printed out on paper. In the final stage, the computer reads
the object code and executes one instruction at a time.5
The distinctions between source and object code and the
forms which both may take are the focal point for two issues:
49. For the purposes of this article, source and flow charts may be treated alike.
The differences between these two become more critical as the flow chart becomes
less detailed. The Commission indicated that a computer program could be a copy of
a flow chart if the flow chart was sufficiently detailed to allow a programmer to write
out the program line-by-line. This test is in accordance with a proposal made by the
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations (ADAPSO) to amend the copy-
right law so as to clarify the scope of protection in computer software and related
materials. The related materials would include a "program description," defined as "a
complete procedural representation in verbal, schematic, or other form, in sufficient
detail to determine a set of instructions constituting a corresponding computer pro-
gram." H.R. 6983, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
50. There is an intermediate stage between source and object code where the
computer program takes the form of "assembly language." For our purposes, assem-
bly language and source may be treated as equivalent. No one has argued in the re-
cent literature that there is any legally relevant distinction between the two. For
more information conccrning these technical matters, see Note, Copyright Protection
of Computer Object Code, 96 HARv. L. Rzv. 1723, 1724-26 (1983).
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First, what physical manifestations may source and object
code take without losing their copyright protection? Second,
are both source and object code copyrightable subject matter?
A. Physical Manifestations of Programs Which Have Copy-
right Protection.
The first issue has been explicitly addressed in the 1976
Copyright Act and the 1980 Amendment. Computer programs
are protectable in nearly all of their forms, whether on paper,
stored on computer disks, or stored in memory. In general,
protection extends whenever the programs may be "perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device."51 Prior to the 1976 Cop-
yright Act, it was clear that neither source nor object code was
protected when stored on disks or in computer memory. The
difficulty arose out of the Supreme Court's definition of
"copy" in the piano roll case, White-Smith Publishing v.
Apollo.52 Apollo stood for the proposition that a "copy" was
something that could be perceived by the naked eye. If a ma-
chine was required to perceive the work, then the work was
not a copy." Since source or object code stored on disks or in
computer memory could be perceived only with the use of a
machine, it was not a "copy.
54
The 1976 Copyright Act came close to overruling Apollo
in its entirety. The definition of "copy" in section 101 was
clearly designed to overrule the Apollo case.55 On the other
hand, section 117 appeared to freeze the law regarding com-
puter uses of copyrighted works since it was before the 1976
Act, while Congress was contemplating further legislation.5
51. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) (definition of "copies").
52. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
53. Id. at 17.
54. M. NIMMER, supra note 4, § 8.08.
55. The House Report explained the purpose of the new definition as follows:
It makes no difference what the form, manner, or medium of fixation
may be-whether it is in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any
other graphic or symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a physical object
in written, printed, photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or any
other stable form, and whether it is capable of perception directly or by
means of any machine or device "now known or later developed."
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. AD. NEws,
5659, 5665. See also M. NIMmER, supra note 4 § 2.03(B)(1).
56. See supra note 11 for the language of section 117.
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Two cases have arisen interpreting section 117. The district
court in Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc.,57
concluded that Apollo remained applicable and held that the
object code in a ROM was not a copy of the source code.58 On
appeal, that decision was affirmed on different grounds. The
circuit court found that the plaintiff had lost any possible
copyright protection by failing to affix a proper copyright no-
tice.59 Thus, the circuit court did not consider whether the ob-ject code was a copy of the source code.60 The second district
court to intepret section 117 held, in Tandy Corp. v. Personal
Microcomputers, Inc.,61 that a ROM was a copy of the source
and concluded that Congress intended to extend protection to
computer software in this form.62 The court asserted that sec-
tion 117 did not freeze copyright law regarding the definition
of the word "copy." Rather, section 117 was concerned only
with the use of a program in a computer, and not with dupli-
cation of a program. 8 The repeal of section 117 by the 1980
Amendment has put to rest the Apollo decision with respect
57. 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979), afl'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038
(7th Cir. 1980).
58. 480 F. Supp. at 1068.
59. 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
60. Nimmer argues that the circuit court's holding implied that the ROM was a
copy of the computer program:
That is, the Court of Appeals held for the defendant on the ground that
the plaintiff had published its computer program in the form of a silicon
chip without affixing a copyright notice . . . thereby injecting the work
into the public domain. Since a copyright notice need only be affixed to
published copies or phonorecords ... and since a silicon chip is clearly
not a phonorecord ... the Court of Appeals must have tacitly assumed
that it is a "copy," notwithstanding the contrary construction of § 117
by the court below.
M. NIMMER, supra note 4, § 8.08, n.18. Nimmer's reading is strained. In light of the
absence of copyright notice, the question of whether the ROM was a copy or not was
not before the court.
61. 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
62. The court quoted the House Report's explanation for the new definition of
"copy," see supra note 55, and stated that "the imprinting of a computer program on
a silicon chip, which then allows the computer to read the program and act upon its
instructions, falls easily within this definition." Id. at 173.
63. The court noted that section 117 froze the law only "with respect to the use
of [a] work in conjunction with" a computer. Id. at 174. A duplication is not used "in
conjunction with" a computer; it is simply copying. The court also noted that "any
other interpretation would render the theoretical ability to copyright computer pro-grams virtually meaningless." Id. at 175. The court's reasoning is not entirely con-
vincing in light of the fact that section 117 of the 1976 Copyright Act anticipated
further legislative activity.
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to source and object code stored on disks or in short term
memory."'
Computer programs commonly take two other physical
forms to which copyright protection may not extend. First,
copyright may not protect a program in its final stage as a
series of individual instructions executed by the computer cir-
cuitry. The Commission indicated that it was unsure whether
a program in this form was a protectable work or an unpro-
tectable process. 5 The relevant question is a factual one: Is
the alleged infringer reading each instruction, which would be
no different than reading the program from memory (imper-
missible under copyright law), or is the infringer simply ob-
serving the computer as it executes each instruction and de-
riving the program from that observation, similar to someone
who derives game instructions by watching a game being
played." Second, copyright may not protect programs that
take the form of etchings on a semiconductor chip. Such
chips, unlike ROMs, generally do not contain actual instruc-
64. "This issue is now rendered moot by reason of the 1980 amendment to Sec-
tion 117." M. NiMUER, supra note 4, § 8.08, at 8-110.
65. The difficulty arises from the Supreme Court holding in Baker v. Selden,
101 U.S. 841 (1879), which states that the use of a system does not infringe the copy-
right in the description of the system. Thus, according to the Commission, "copyright
... protects the program so long as it remains fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion but does not protect the electro-mechanical funtioning of a machine." Final Re-
port, supra note 12, at 20. The Commission noted later in the Final Report that:
[o]nly when the program is inserted - instruction by instruction - into
the processing element of the computer and electrical impulses are sent
through the circuitry of the processor to initiate work is the ability to
copy lost. This is true at least under the present state of technology. If it
should prove possible to tap off these impulses then, perhaps, the pro-
cess would be all that was appropriated, and no infringemnt of the copy-
right would occur.
The movement of electrons through the wires and components of a
computer is precisely that process over which copyright has no control.
Thus, copyright leads to the result that anyone is free to make a com-
puter carry out any unpatented process, but not to misappropriate an-
other's writing to do so.
Id. at 22. See generally Reznick, Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Comput-
ing Co.: Copyright Protection for Computer Formats and the Idea/Expression Di-
chotomy, 8 RUT. J. CoMPuraRs, TECH. & L. 65 (1980); Note, Copyright Protection for
Computer Programs Under the 1976 Act, 52 IND. L.J. 503, 511-514 (1977).
66. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 4, § 2.18[3][a].
67. A semiconductor chip is a product "having two or more layers of metallic,
insulating, or semiconductor material, deposited on or etched away from a piece of
semiconductor material in accordance with a predetermined pattern ... intended to
perform electronic circuitry functions." H.R. 1028, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.(1983).
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tions which are read and executed by a processor. Rather, the
logic of the circuits on the chip mirrors the logic of a particu-
lar computer program. The chip is like the uncopyrightable
building built from copyrightable plans.68 Legislation is cur-
rently before Congress to provide a form of copyright protec-
tion for semiconductor chips."
B. The Copyrightability of Source and Object Code
The differences between source and object code present
further difficulties of statutory interpretation. Source code
probably was protected even under copyright law as it existed
prior to the 1976 Copyright Act. Although no cases found a
copyright in a computer program, the Copyright Office began
registering source in 1964.7" A court deciding a case today
under pre-1978 law would almost certainly be willing to ac-
cept the judgment of the Copyright Office. House Reports
make it clear that in the 1976 Act and 1980 Amendment
source is classified as a "literary work" under section 102 of
the 1976 Copyright Act, and is thus copyrightable subject
matter. 1
The Commission believed that the 1976 Copyright Act
also provided protection for object code and, thus, there was
no need to add new language to sections 101 or 102 of the
Act.72 This raises a rather difficult problem of statutory inter-
68. See generally 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 4, § 2.08[D].
69. Id. Legislation would "amend Title 17 of the United States Code to protect
semiconductor chips and masks against unauthorized duplication." 129 Cong. Rec.
H201 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1983).
70. See COPYRIGHT OFFICE CIRCULAR 31D (Jan. 1965). A certificate of registra-
tion constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of a copyright. See 17 U.S.C. §
410 and M. NIMMER, § 7.16(d).
71. The House Committee Report to the 1976 Copyright Act stated that the
definition of "literary works . . . includes computer data bases, and computer pro-
grams." H.R. REP. No. 1476 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 116, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5667. The House Report to the 1980 Amendment indicated
that the amendment "has the effect of clearly applying the 1976 law to computer
programs." H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6492, 6509.
72. Final Report, supra note 12, at 21:
The Commission has considered at length the various forms in which
programs may be fixed. Flow charts, source codes, and object codes are
works of authorship in which copyright subsists, provided they are the
product of sufficient intellectual labor to surpass the "insufficient intel-
lectual labor" hurdle, which the instructions "apply hook to wall" fail to
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pretation. Since there was no language in the 1980 Amend-
ment which definitively addressed the issue, it is uncertain
whether Congress adopted the Commission's interpretation of
sections 101 and 102 of the 1976 Act. Of course, if the Com-
mission's interpretation of the 1976 Act is correct as a matter
of law, then the question of congressional adoption of the
Commission's interpretation becomes irrelevant. At least one
commentator, Richard Stern, has written that object code was
not protected under the 1976 Act and protection was not ex-
tended under the 1980 Amendment.78 Because of the impor-
tance of this issue, his arguments deserve some scrutiny.
The major premise of Stern's argument is that "the statu-
tory definition of copy would seem to be conditioned on
human-intelligibility. 7 4 Since object code is, according to
Stern, "unintelligible even to trained observers, 71 6 it follows
that object code cannot be a copy under the copyright law.
Although in theory, as Stern argues, a computer program
could be written to reverse-compile object code and transform
it into source code, this fact does not imply that the object
code is. a copy of the source code. After all, a chair may be
reverse-compiled to produce a blueprint, but that does not
mean the chair is a copy of the blueprint for copyright
purposes.76
These arguments are similar to those presented by Com-
missioner Hersey in his dissent to the Commission's recom-
mendations. Hersey argued that object code, in contrast to
source code, does not communicate anything to humans. Its
sole function is to communicate with a machine (or perhaps
simply to control a machine). Hersey distinguishes record
players and video-tapes on the ground that the sole function
of such devices is to communicate the author's expression.
Computers, on the other hand, perform other mechanical or
73. Stern, Another Look at Copyright Protection of Software: Did the 1980 Act
Do Anything for Object Code?, 3 CoMPUER L.J. 1 (1981). Stern's arguments are also
considered and rejected in Note, supra note 50, at 1729-32.
The Third and Ninth Circuits have held that object code is copyrightable. Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984); Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 714 F.2d.1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690
(1984).
74. Stern, supra note 73, at 11.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 12.
[Vol. 231018
COMPUTER AMENDMENT
computational functions."
The fundamental flaw in both Hersey's and Stern's treat-
ment is the erroneous assumption that object code is incapa-
ble of communicating to the average computer programmer8.7
In fact, reading object code is not fundamentally different
from reading musical notes from a score, and is a skill that is
readily acquired by any competent computer programmer.7 9
Generally, object code takes the form of a long string of num-
bers. Each number has a specific meaning to the particular
type of machine on which the object code is to be executed. In
the instruction manuals that accompany many computers,
there is a conversion table for object code numbers to machine
function. With this table, it is a trivial matter to read the ob-
ject code and understand the computer program. Since such
tables often accompany compilers as well, it is also usually a
trivial matter to convert from object code to source state-
ments. But, of course, it is not necessary to make any conver-
sion at all since, with practice, it becomes possible to read the
object code "directly." This occurs in the same manner as
When a person learns to speak a new language. With practice,
conversion from the foreign language to the native language
becomes unnecessary, and the person gradually learns to
think in the foreign language and to understand it directly.
77. See Final Report, supra note 12, at 28-29.
78. Hersey and Stern are not alone in making this erroneous assumption. See,
e.g., Data Cash Sys. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. InI. 1979); Pope &
Pope, Protection of Proprietary Interests in Computer Software, 30 ALA. L. REV.
527, 531 (1979); Comment, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 47 TENN.
L. REV. 787, 799 (1980) (citing Data Cash).
Professor Maggs has noted that some programs are so large and complex that it
would require years of study of the object code to understand the programs. Maggs,
Computer Programs as the Object of Intellectual Property in the United States of
America, 30 (Supp.) AM. J. COMPUTER L. 251, 256 (1982). This fact does not mean,
however, that object code should be denied protection. The same difficulties in com-
prehension can occur with large and complex programs written in a higher-level lan-
guage, particularly if the programs lack documentation. Surely no one would argue,
however, that such difficulties justify restricting copyright only to those programs
which have adequate documentation.
79. One of the authors (Kelso) worked for several years as a system programmer
on the PLATO system at the University of Illinois. This work entailed reading object
code in order to diagnose software bugs which caused the system to "crash." When
the system crashed, the only output produced was a printout of the contents of cen-
tral memory. This constituted approximately 32,000 60-bit words of memory (every
three bits was printed as a number in base 8). Despite the overwhelming amount of
information produced, it was usually a straightforward task to track down software
bugs.
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Although source code is usually more convenient to read than
object code, there may be times when it is necessary to read
the object code, for example, when the source program no
longer exists or when there are errors in the compiler. In these
cases, the object code is a more reliable source of information
than is the source program. Thus, if copyright is to be denied
to object code, the reasons for such denial cannot include the
supposed non-intelligibility of object code.
Even if object code was not protected under the 1976
Copyright Act, it does not follow, as Stern argues, that the
lack of protection continues after the 1980 Amendment.8 The
1980 Amendment clearly implies that object code is copyright-
able. The Amendment defines a "computer program" as "a set
of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly
in a computer in order to bring about a certain result."81 This
definition naturally includes object code which is used "di-
rectly" in a computer, as opposed to source code which is used
"indirectly" in a computer.2 Further, section 117 was
amended by the 1980 Amendment to provide for the "fair
use" of computer programs in the preparation of "copies or
adaptations."8 Although the word "adaptation" is not defined
in the Act, it seems apparent from the Final Report that the
word embraces the compilation of object code from source
80. Noting that the 1980 Amendment does not state that all computer programs
are copyrightable and does not expressly refer to the copyrightability of object code,
Stern argues that the legislative history contained in the Commission's Final Report
is therefore of dubious value in light of the 1980 Amendment's silence. Stern, supra
note 73, at 12.
81. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982); see supra note 16.
82. Professor Maggs has made the proper interpretation:
The words "directly or indirectly" are easier to interpret. An example of
a program to be used directly in a computer would be one sold on a
memory cartridge meant to be plugged into a home computer game sys-
tem. A program to be used indirectly in a computer would be a program
sold on computer tape in the FORTRAN language with the expectation
that the user would copy the program to disk storage and then have the
computer translate it to machine language.
Maggs, supra note 78, at 258. Maggs' article contains other interesting puzzles con-
cerning the definitions of "statements or instructions," "to be used," "a computer,"
and "a certain result."
Stern rejects this argument on the ground that there is no legislative history to
support the interpretation. See Stern, supra note 73, at 12. There is, however, no
legislative history to rebut the interpretation, and Stern offers no other plausible in-
terpretation of the words "directly or indirectly."
83. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1980); see supra note 11.
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code." Therefore, it may fairly be argued by implication that
unauthorized copying of object code constitutes infringement
of the copyright in the program. 5 Finally, object code must be
protected if the economic balance created by the 1980 Amend-
ment is to be maintained. For the computer program pirate,
object code is equivalent to source code." It would seriously
84. Concerning the "fair use" exception for "adaptations," the commission
noted that copyright law "grants to copyright proprietors the exclusive right to pre-
pare translations, transformations, and adaptations of their work." Final Report,
supra note 12, at 13. The commission defined "object code" as a "version of a pro-
gram in which the source code language is converted or translated into the machine
language of the computer with which it is to be used." Id. at 21 n.109 (emphasis
added). The obvious implication is that object code is at least an "adaptation" and
perhaps a "derivative work."
Stern argues that object code is not an adaptation of a source program:
The [Final Report] recommending enactment of section 117 gave two
examples of adaptation of programs. One example was conversion of a
program from one higher-level language to another, perhaps from BA-
SIC to FORTRAN. This is clearly a reference to source programs, for
only they are written in high level languages. The other example was to
add features to the program. Again, this necessarily involves source
code. Adaptation is a procedure that can be done only at the source code
level. It calls for a human being to revise a program intelligible to him,
by modifying an intelligible copy written in source code, not object code.
Stern, supra note 73, at 13 (footnotes omitted).
Stern's conclusion here again relies almost exclusively on the belief that object
code is unintelligible. As previously discussed, in text accompanying notes 78-79, ob-
ject code is readily intelligible. Furthermore, Stern is wrong when he says that only
source code may be modified. During the author's (Kelso's) tenure at the University
of Illinois, see supra note 79, he occasionally modified the object code of an active
program and also wrote a number of small programs in object code, bypassing the
source code stage of program development. Finally, for certain applications, conver-
sion of object code is vastly simpler than conversion of source code. For example, the
languages for use with Z80 and 8080 microcomputers contain syntactical differences
(Z80 is a more advanced version of 8080). However, the 8080 object code is similar to
the Z80 object. That is, object code which runs on an 8080 should, with minor modifi-
cations, run on a Z80; this is referred to as "upward compatibility". Thus, it would be
simpler to convert the 8080 object code to Z80 object code than to convert the 8080
source code.
85. The implication follows from the opening words of section 117: "notwith-
standing the provisions of section 106." That is, absent section 117, such an adapta-
tion would have been an infringement under section 106. This conclusion finds sup-
port in the Final Report, supra note 12, at 13, where the Commission wrote, in
support of the necessity for section 117, that copyright "grants to copyright proprie-
tors the exclusive right to prepare translations, transformations, and adaptations of
their work" (emphasis added). The commission cites 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (exclusive
right to prepare derivative works) for this proposition. It seems evident, therefore,
that the commission believed that an "adaptation" was a "derivative work."
86. The cost of decoding object code is negligible compared to the cost of devel-
oping a program from scratch. Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc. 685 F.2d
870, 877 (3d Cir. 1982) (computer programs are copyrightable).
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undermine the purpose of the 1980 Amendment if courts were
to ignore this reality.
C. Congruence of Patent and Copyright
Commissioner Nimmer, in his concurring opinion in the
Final Report, proposed a compromise that falls somewhere
between the views expressed by the majority of the Commis-
sion, on the one hand, and by Stern in his article and Com-
missioner Hersey in his dissent, on the other. He argued that
at some time in the future, "it may prove desirable to limit
copyright protection for software to those computer programs
which produce works which themselves qualify for copyright
protection. '8 7
Under this proposed rule, a program designed for use
with a legal retrieval system would be copyrightable, as would
a program for a computer game. Both produce copyrightable
displays. Nimmer notes that programs which control heating
or air-conditioning in a building, or traffic signals, or the flow
of fuel in an engine would not be copyrightable since the out-
put of the program would not be copyrightable. He explained
his proposed rule as follows:
The [rule] here suggested appears to me to be consistent
with the recognized copyrightability of sound recordings.
It sometimes has been argued that while printed instruc-
tions tell how to do work, computer programs actually do
the work. But this is also true of sound recordings, which
in a sense constitute a machine (the phonorecord) com-
municating with another machine (the record player). A
sound recording contained in a phonorecord does not tell
a record player how to make sounds which constitute a
Cole Porter melody. Rather, it activates the record player
in such manner as actually to create such a melody. But
Commissioner Hersey has made another and most impor-
tant distinction. "The direct product of a sound record-
ing, when it is put in a record player, is the sound of mu-
sic - the writing of the author in its audible form." The
point is that the operation of the sound recording pro-
duces a musical work which itself is copyrightable. That
is sufficient to render the sound recording itself copy-
rightable quite apart from the separate copyright in the
87. Final Report, supra note 12, at 27.
[Vol. 231022
COMPUTER AMENDMENT
musical work."'
Under this theory of copyright of recordings, the evil
remedied by an action for infringement is not the physical act
of copying the magnetic impulses off of a tape, but the appro-
priation of the capability of communicating what is on the
tape to a potential audience.
While there is a surface appeal to Nimmer's view, there
are also some practical anomalies. Consider a program which
controls water temperature in a washer by opening and clos-
ing hot and cold water valves. Such a program, under Nim-
mer's rule, would not be protected. Now suppose that the pro-
gram also controls a display panel on the front of the washer.
The display panel shows the water temperature and the de-
gree to which the hot or cold water valves are open (for exam-
ple, "wide open," "half-way," or "shut down"). Such a display
might be copyrightable.8 9 Does the existence of the display
panel imply that all of the underlying program is copyright-
able, or only that portion of the program which controls the
display panel? This difficult question troubled the majority of
the Commission. They saw Commissioner Nimmer's propo-
sal as invoking a distinction based solely on the intended use
of a program, a distinction not previously made in copyright
law."'
88. Id.
89. Copyright might inhere in the format of such a display and perhaps the
words used. Professor Maggs also uses a washing-machine example in Maggs, Some
Problems of Legal Protection of Programs for Microcomputer Control Systems, 1979
U. ILL. L.F. 453, 462-63.
90. See Final Report, supra note 12, at 21: "[T]he likelihood is that entrepre-
neurs would simply require that programs produce a written and, by that token, an
unquestionably copyrightable version of their output to obtain copyright in the pro-
grams themselves."
Nimmer's response to this objection is "[t]he fact that such a program might also
provide for a printout of written instructions (which would be copyrightable) would
only render protectable that particular aspect of such a program." Id. at 27.
Nimmer's response seems incomplete. He provides no clue as to how a court
might go about determining what "particular aspect" deserves protection. Does he
mean that only those program lines which contain copyrightable material should be
protected? Such an interpretation, protecting only the output and not the computer
program itself, seems too narrow. Or, alternatively, does Nimmer believe that the
behavior of the entire program is necessary to determine the copyrightable output?
This interpretation seems too broad. It is not clear that a reasoned line can be drawn
between these two extremes. See infra note 93.
91. The Commission wrote that Nimmer's proposal "does not square with copy-
right practice past and present, which recognizes copyright protection for a work of
authorship regardless of the uses to which it may be put." See Final Report supra
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Although the majority's cursory treatment of Nimmer's
proposal may have been warranted in light of Nimmer's own
brevity, Nimmer's ideas, when combined with the Supreme
Court's recent decisions in Diehr and Bradley, suggest an in-
teresting congruence between patent and copyright protection
of software,92 namely, that when the primary effect of a pro-
gram is to control machine elements within a larger mechani-
cal or chemical process, that program should not be copyright-
able. 8 Even if the program produces displays for human
note 12, at 42. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954); Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252 (3d Cir. 1983), cert dismissed, 104 S.
Ct. 690 (1984). The majority, despite their rejection of his proposal, seemed to sym-
pathize with Nimmer's concerns: "Although [Nimmer's rule] tries to achieve the sep-
aration of idea from form of expression, that objective is better achieved through the
courts exercising their judgment in particular cases." Final Report, supra note 12, at
43.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 27-34. Professor Maggs noted the possi-
ble congruence of patent and copyright law in an article written after the Final Re-
port was issued but before Congress had taken any action on the report: "If Congress
passes the legislation recommended by (the Commission), it should exclude from cop-
yright protection computer programs with purely mechanical functions. Concurrently,
Congress should provide patent protection for those programs that meet the stan-
dards for patents." Maggs, supra note 89, at 462.
93. See supra note 33. The key words in this statement are, of course, "primary
effect." Factors in determining "primary effect" should include such things as the
purpose for which the program was originally designed, the use to which it actually is
put, and the extent to which human intervention is required for the program to oper-
ate within the overall mechanical or chemical process.
An alternative contemplated by both Nimmer and Maggs is that copyright would
protect the display or message portions of a program and patent would protect the
rest of the program. See supra note 90 and Maggs, supra note 89, at 462.
As already noted, there is no easy line between display and non-display portions
of a program. See supra note 90. Assume that the display is a piece of text which
physically appears in the program. In such a case, it could be argued that the "dis-
play portion" of the program is simply the text itself rather than the program state-
ments which cause the text to be displayed. But, suppose that the program has a
dictionary of words with which it may build several sentences. The individual words
would hardly seem copyrightable. The copyrightable expression would be the
sentences, not the words individually, although the sentences would not appear phys-
ically in the program. Another test might, however, include most of the program. The
fundamental problem with any of these approaches is that the courts are not techni-
cally competent to make the necessary judgments. Further, the distinctions to be
drawn involve considerations about which expert witnesses could differ.
This discussion refers only to copyright protection of the program. Even assum-
ing that the program is not copyrightable, it may well be that the display produced
by the program is copyrightable. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Con-
sumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982) (preliminary injunction granted
for infringing copy of PAC-MAN audiovisual game based on characteristics of dis-
play); Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 523 F. Supp. 635, 639 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (pre-
liminary injunction granted for infringement of plaintiff's electronic video games
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monitoring of the process, such displays are not central to the
performance of the computer program. Nor would production
of such displays have been the efficient cause for the creation
of the entire computer program. Although not eligible for cop-
yright protection, the program, in conjunction with the ma-
chine elements which it controls, should be eligible for patent
protection under Diehr and Bradley.94 This distinction be-
tween copyrightable and patentable computer programs might
satisfy the concerns of those who believe that copyright
should not be extended to computer programs because of the
"machine quality" of computer programs.
IV. SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY
The gravamen of any infringement suit is the allegation
that the defendant copied the plaintiff's work. Since actual
copying is difficult to prove, the courts have developed the
doctrine that copying may be inferred if the plaintiff can show
that the defendant had access and that the infringing work is
substantially similar to the plaintiff's work.9 5 Expert testi-
mony may be used as evidence of similarity between two pro-
grams. A drawback of the use of expert testimony, however, is
its reliance on the subjective beliefs of one person. It is, there-
fore, advisable to butress subjective expert testimony with ob-
"Kamikaze" and "Astro Invaders"). The court wrote in Stern that "[ain audiovisual
display is an appropriate subject for a copyright even if the underlying computer
program is not copyrighted." Id. at 639.
Finally, the proposed interpretation of copyright law is inconsistent with the
clear intention of the Commission embodied in the majority's rejection of Nimmer's
proposal. Statutory amendment is possible, although unlikely in the immediate fu-
ture. The only option, therefore, is to attack the constitutionality of the copyright law
as it applies to programs whose primary function is to control machine elements. See
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(preliminary injunction denied on ground that object code might not be copyrightable
on constitutional grounds that it is not a writing), rev'd, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d. Cir. 1983),
cert dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984). Such a constitutional challenge is likely to fail,
however, since the Supreme Court has historically given Congress wide leeway in de-
fining what constitutes a "writing" for copyright purposes. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Cali-
fornia, 412 U.S. 546 (1973); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53
(1884). See also Maggs, supra note 89, at 461.
94. The overlap between copyright and patent would not be perfect since the
hurdles to securing a patent are greater than those to securing a copyright. See supra
text accompanying note 27. Further, the patent in such a case would protect not the
naked computer program, but the whole process of which the program is a part. See
supra text accompanying note 33.
95. See M. NIMMER, supra note 4, § 13.03.
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jective and provable facts.9 e In order to determine what objec-
tive criteria might exist, it is necessary to consider briefly
some of the methods of copying computer programs which are
likely to be used in the near future.
Exact copying, where the infringing program is identical
to the plaintiff's program is the most obvious example of sub-
stantial similarity. This form of infringement, is the most eco-
nomically favorable to the infringer since there will be no
need to develop or test the infringing program. Exact copying
is thus likely to be a common form of infringement.
9 7
The next most obvious example of substantial similarity
involves minor changes to such things as the copyright notice,
title page, or other identifying parts of the program. This type
of infringement is similar to exact coyping. As with exact cop-
ying, the cost involved in making such trivial changes is small
since there need be no further development or extensive test-
ing of the changes.98
While these two examples provide clear cases of substan-
tial similarity, proof of this requirement is likely to be less
clear in other cases. In such cases the derivative program may
not look like the original program, even though the two pro-
grams behave identically. This situation may occur when: (1)
all variable names are changed, 99 (2) the source is reordered,
i.e., sections or blocks of code are moved around without
96. Expert testimony has had a somewhat checkered history. The current
thinking seems to be that expert testimony should be allowed if it is the best evidence
available: "It has been suggested that '[like the hearsay and original documents rules
[the opinion rule] is a "best evidence" rule. The more concrete description is pre-
ferred to the more abstract' because it is more reliable, since with each abstraction by
the witness the possibility of error increases." J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEIN-
STEIN'S EVIDENCE 701-01 (footnotes omitted). The primary difficulty with expert testi-
mony in infringement actions is that the court is not likely to have the technical
competence to choose between the testimony offered. Consequently, "[i]f the plaintiff
could find one expert who was willing to testify to striking similarities, the defendant
could, no doubt, get two to swear to the contrary." Gemignani, Legal Protection for
Computer Software: The View from '79, 7 Rut. J. COMPUTERS TECH. & L. 269, 288
(1980).
97. Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
98. Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal.
1981).
99. In programs written in "higher" languages, such as FORTRAN or PASCAL,
the programmer may declare variables with ordinary names. For example, in a com-
puter diary program, important variables might be "day," "month," and "year." If
someone were to steal that program, one easy way of altering its appearance is to
change the variable names to "dnumber," "mnumber," and "ynumber."
1026 [Vol. 23
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changing the program behavior, (3) minor syntax changes are
made which do not change the program behavior, or (4) the
program is translated line by line into a different computer
language. Each of the above derivations could be carried out
almost exclusively by "translator" computer programs which
are already in widespread use. 00 These forms of copying are
illegal without the consent of the copyright owner.
There are legitimate uses of a copyrighted program in the
creation of a new program. Since copyright does not protect
ideas, a programmer could use the ideas underlying the copy-
righted program. Further, programmers often draw upon solu-
tions to specific programming problems by using nearly iden-
tical source statements taken from already tested and working
computer programs. This occurs in much the same way that
lawyers, when writing new contracts, draw upon the language
used in previous contracts. 10' This type of use should be en-
couraged since it advances the state of the art and does not
give the author of the derivative program an unfair economic
advantage over the copyright owner. The author of the deriva-
tive program cannot avoid costly development and testing of
the program. 0 Because the economic imbalance which justi-
100. Such programs are currently used for the legitimate purpose of translating
a computer program from one language to another. Such translations, if essential for
use, are protected by the fair use provisions of section 117. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 103-106.
101. In Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958), the
court held that the defendant's use of the plaintiff's copyrighted legal forms was not
an infringement because "[tihe evidence here shows that [the defendant] insofar as it
has used the language of [the plaintiff's] forms has done so only as incidental to its
use of the underlying idea." Id. at 706.
This rule would not protect wholesale copying of an entire program, since there
are almost always many ways to write a program. See Final Report, supra note 12,
n.106. It should be noted, however, that as the size and complexity of a program
decreases, the likelihood that several programmers will independently write source
code which look alike increases. The degree of similarity will naturally depend on
several subjective factors such as the sophistication of the programmers, their previ-
ous experience in writing programs directed at the same sorts of problems, and their
training in school concerning the style of programs. One important objective factor, is
the degree to which a problem admits of a most efficient solution. Most programmers
strive to write code that is both elegant and efficient. To the extent that such a goal is
attainable, the number of programming solutions to a problem decreases as less effi-
cient or less elegant code is discarded.
102. The use affords some economic advantage to the user since it saves the
user from having to develop that particular piece of code independently. However, as
long as the bulk of a program is new code or borrowed code put together in a new
way, such economic advantage will not be of the character or magnitude required to
give the user an unfair advantage. See supra text accompanying notes 19-24.
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fies copyright protection for the original program does not ex-
ist, copyright law should not interfere to prevent the second
author's use.'
The above considerations and examples suggest that ob-
jective indicia of copying include the extent to which one pro-
gram behaves in the same manner as, or performs the same
functions as, the original program, 10 4 and the ease with which
the infringing program may be derived from the original pro-
gram. We propose that a presumption of copying should be
raised against the defendant if the plaintiff can prove the fol-
lowing facts: (1) access; (2) that the allegedly infringing pro-
gram behaves in the same manner as or performs the same
functions as the copyrighted program; and (3) that the alleg-
edly infringing program may be derived from the copyrighted
program by a mostly mechanical, inexpensive process.
Application of this test should encourage the develop-
ment of better programs by allowing programmers to follow
the teachings of existing programs without causing severe eco-
nomic harm to the copyright owner. This result would be con-
sistent with the economic rationale of the 1980 Amendment.
V. FAIR USE AND RIGHTS OF ADAPTATION
Section 117 was amended in 1980 and now contains provi-
sions dealing with fair use and transfer of programs from one
purchaser to another. Legitimate uses include inputting the
program into a computer, running the program, and archiving
the program. This section clarifies the obvious-the owner of
a computer program has the right to use it in his or her com-
puter regardless of the copyright.
There are extremely troubling ambiguities in this section.
Section 117 provides, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an
infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer pro-
gram to make or authorize the making of another copy or
adaptation of that computer program provided:
103. See supra text accompanying notes 19-24.
104. In all of the examples in the text, the derivative program would behave
exactly as the original program. That is, a person using the program would be unable,
on the basis of use alone, to determine which program was executing. Identical behav-
ior could also, of course, result from the appropriation of ideas rather than expres-
sion. Such appropriation would not be in violation of the copyright law. Thus, identi-
cal behavior by itself is not sufficient to support a finding of infringement.
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(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as
an essential step in the utilization of the computer pro-
gram and that it is used in no other manner .... 105
The first difficulty is determining what constitutes an
"adaptation." The Commission described the adaptation right
as allowing the program owner the "right to make those
changes necessary to enable the use for which it was both sold
and purchased."' 0" This right includes "[the] conversion of a
program from one higher-level language to another to facili-
tate use . . . [and] the right to add features to the program
that were not present at the time of rightful acquisition.' 10 7
The right to translate from one high-level language to another
makes sense in light of the non-standardization of computer
languages. The right to add new features is more surprising.
The Commission analogizes this right to that of note-taking in
the margin of a book, where even if note-taking is considered
to be creating a derivative work, the copyright owner is hardly
concerned with such a "violation." 10 8 The Commission also
noted that sales of many software programs are made with
full awareness that the program owners will modify the pro-
grams. Indeed, some vendors provide technical assistance to
users who wish to modify their programs. Finally, to avoid po-
tential injury to the copyright owner, the right to adapt is
tempered by the final clause of section 117 which prohibits
the program owner from transferring an adaptation without
the copyright owner's permission.' 09
Despite the Commission's laudable intentions in fashion-
ing this practical adaptation right, section 117 leaves a num-
ber of questions unanswered. Consider the case of educational
programs. Most of these programs have the name of the au-
thor on a title page, complete, with copyright notice. Does sec-
tion 117 give a program owner the right to alter the substance
of the educational program in preparation for student use? If
the materials were in book form, such alteration would violate
the copyright owner's right to make derivative works." 0 The
copyright owner should, therefore, receive similar protection
105. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982); see supra note 16.
106. Final Report, supra note 12, at 13.
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. Id.
109. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982); see supra note 16.
110. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982).
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from alterations of a computer program. Section 117 says that
such copy or adaptation must be used "in conjunction with a
machine, and that it [may not be] used in [any] other man-
ner."'11 A substantive adaptation, in contrast with a technical
modification which does not alter what is seen on the screen,
would arguably be used not only "in conjunction with" a ma-
chine, "as permitted by section 117, but also "in conjunction
with" the students taking the materials." 2
The statute seems overly vague in regard to this problem.
While the Commission indicates that the adaptation right
"could only be exercised so long as [it] did not harm the inter-
ests of the copyright proprietor,""I this apparently broad pro-
tection of the copyright owner's interests is not reflected in
the language of the statute. Given the ambiguity, courts
should go beyond the language of section 117 and look to the
Final Report by the Commission for guidance as to proper
interpretation.
Another problem with section 117 is the lack of guidance
regarding what constitutes a fair use of copies or of adapta-
tions of a program." 4 Consider the following facts and hy-
potheticals: the owner of a copyright in a computer program
sells one copy of the program to Buyer. The program is in
object code format and is on a diskette. Buyer has ten em-
ployees, each of whom has a terminal. The employees use the
program in the following ways:
(1) Buyer allows the employees to use the diskette, one
employee at a time. An employee puts the diskette into his or
her desk-top terminal, and the terminal copies the program
from the diskette to a fast memory contained in the terminal.
This copy is not an infringing copy since it was created "as an
111. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982) (emphasis added); see supra note 16.
112. Another possible interpretation of the statute which would prohibit such
alterations is that the adaptation right is applicable only to computer programs, and
not to data which is stored in a computer. Arguably, the words which appear on the
screen of a terminal are data and not "statements or instructions" which make up a
computer program. Indeed, some computer programs are mere "drivers" that do
nothing but pull text out of a data block. If such text is data, then changes to the text
would not be protected by the fair use provisions 'of section 117.
113. Final Report, supra note 12, at 13.
114. We now focus on the following language of section 117: "(1) that such a
new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the com-
puter program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner
.... "17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982) (emphasis added). See supra note 16.
115. See generally Maggs, supra note 78, at 261-262.
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essential step" in the use of the diskette.1 When an em-
ployee is finished, the diskette is passed on to the next em-
ployee. This procedure is analogous to passing a book around
among employees and is not an infringing use.117
(2) Buyer makes ten copies of the diskette and distributes
the copies to his employees. Each employee may use the dis-
kette in his or her desk-top terminal. This is an infringement
of the copyright-it is analogous to making photo-copies of a
book for use by employees. 1
(3) Buyer's ten desk-top terminals are connected by data
lines to a central database. The desk-top terminals have their
own processor and some fast memory, but nothing is stored
permanently in the terminal. In this system, when no one is
using the program, the program is located on a single perma-
nent disk (i.e., the central database). When a user desires to
access the program, a copy of the object code is sent from the
database to the terminal and is there executed. Thus, if all ten
employees desire to access the program, there may be ten cop-
ies of the program located in the fast memory of the ten
terminals.
In this last example the first question is whether the ob-
ject code stored temporarily in the terminals is a "copy." In
order to be a "copy" under section 101, a work must be
"fixed" and be capable of being "perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a
machine or device." To be "fixed," a work must be "suffi-
ciently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, re-
produced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more
than transitory duration."11 9 Under these definitions, the pro-
gram stored in memory would seem to be a "copy" since the
object code may be perceived with the aid of a machine and
116. This is one of the most obvious cases of fair use. A contrary 'result would
be analogous to preventing the owner of a book from reading the book without get-
ting permission from the copyright owner. The Commission wrote the following: "Be-
cause the placement of a work into a computer is the preparation of a copy, the law
should provide that persons in rightful possession of copies of programs be able to use
them freely without fear of exposure to copyright liability." Final Report, supra note
12, at 13.
117. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) the right of an owner of a particular copy to dispose
of that copy; see also M. NIMMER, supra note 4, § 8.11-.12.
118. Professor Maggs suggests that this result can be reached by arguing "that
only the copies necessary for use in the first computer were 'essential' to the use of
the program." Maggs, supra note 78, at 262; see infra text accompanying note 121.
119. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
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will continue to exist in memory for as long as the user desires
to use the program-a period of time greater than transitory
duration.
The second question is whether the object code is a copy
created "as an essential step in the utilization of the computer
program in conjunction with a machine" and is, thus pro-
tected by section 117. We suggest that such use is not "essen-
tial . . . in conjunction with a machine." It is relatively clear
from the Final Report that the Commission adopted the lan-
guage of section 117 in response to the fact that a program in
source format usually must be translated into object code in
order to run on a computer. The Commission wanted to make
clear that this object code is not an infringing copy of the
source code since the object code in this example is used
solely in conjunction with the use of the program in a
machine. 120
Returning to the hypothetical, it may be argued that the
copies in the desk-top terminals are not being used solely in
conjunction with a machine, but are also being used to allow
ten users to access the program simultaneously. Such use is
similar to that described in the second example where the
program owner made ten copies of the diskette. It is not in
conjunction with a machine, but in conjunction with ten users.
Thus, it may be argued that the ten copies are infringing since
they are not covered by the fair use exception of section 117.
Such an interpretation requires adding the following gloss to
the statutory language: "as an essential step in the use of a
machine with one user."121 Addition of this gloss is consistent
with the intent of the Commission to limit the applicability of
section 117 to cases where it does not prejudice the copyright
owner.
(4) Now, assume that Buyer has ten terminals which are
connected to a time-sharing system. In such a system, there
may be only one central computer with a number of terminals
connected to it. The computer processes each user for a short
time and moves on to the next user. With a fast computer, it
120. See supra text accompanying note 84.
121. Alternatively, the words "a machine" may be interpreted to mean "one
and only one machine," and "machine" may be defined in such a way that the system
described in the text constitutes ten machines (perhaps on the ground that there are
ten processors). See Maggs, supra note 78, at 261. This interpretation, however, leads
to difficulty in the fourth and fifth examples to follow in the text.
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is possible under this scheme to have hundreds of users acces-
sing programs at virtually the same time (strictly speaking, of
course, the users do not access programs "simultaneously"
since the computer only processes one program at a time). In
Buyer's system, when a user wants to access a program, the
computer retrieves a copy from permanent storage and puts it
into a fast memory. Each user has his or her own copy of the
program in memory. Thus, if all ten employees call up the
copyright owner's program, there will be ten copies of the pro-
gram in memory. We suggest that this scheme is exactly anal-
ogous to the desk-top terminal scheme described in the pre-
ceding paragraph. The only difference is that instead of
having ten copies of the object code residing with each termi-
nal, there are ten copies residing in a centralized memory.
(5) Finally, assume that Buyer has a time-sharing system
similar to the one described above. In this system, however,
there is only one copy of the program in fast memory regard-
less of the number of users accessing the program. This is the
usual type of time-sharing system because it achieves a sav-
ings in the amount of fast memory which is being used by a
number of users. The fact that there is only one copy of the
object code in memory does not mean that the ten users
would see exactly the same displays on their screens. Each
user is allocated his or her own set of user-variables which
identify where that user is in the program and control the
manner in which a particular user sees the program. Are there
any infringing copies? As a practical matter, this system is no
different from the time-sharing system described in the pre-
ceding paragraph. In both systems, ten users will be able to
access the same program at virtually the same time. In the
former, however, there are ten copies of the object code while
in the latter, there seems to be only one copy of the object
code.
The first question here is whether, regardless of section
117, this type of use should be considered infringing. Because
there are no ordinary fact patterns which are analogous, 122 we
122. There are two characteristics of the example in the text. First, the copy-
righted work is being used by more than one person simultaneously. This is similar to
a radio or television broadcast. Second, each user may be at a different place in the
program. This is unlike a radio or television broadcast where the entire audience re-
ceives the same broadcast at the same time. It is this second characteristic that
makes conventional analogies difficult to find.
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have devised the following: assume ten people are sitting in
chairs forming a closed circle. Someone brings in a book which
has ten book marks on the first page (the book marks being
different colored paper clips). The first person reads for a
short time, places the book mark next to the line at which he
stopped reading, and passes the book to the person next to
him. Each person repeats the procedure. This is surely not an
infringing use-there is only one copy of the book. The fact
that the readers use this odd interlaced reading pattern is of
little consequence as far as copyright laws are concerned.
This interlacing is precisely what takes place in a time-
sharing computer system. There is, however, a significant dif-
ference between the two examples. In the book example, it
will take the readers a longer time for all of them to read the
book using the interlace method than if they used a sequential
method. 12 8 In the time-sharing computer system, however, it
will take ten users the same amount of time to run all their
programs as it would take one user to run a single program.
This is due to the fact that even though the computer is serv-
ing ten users simultaneously, it is fast enough to serve each
user as quickly as desired. 124 This difference in speed means
that the use of a time-sharing system is a special benefit to
Buyer, a benefit which would not accrue to the buyer of a
book under the interlace reading method. Further, this benefit
is to the direct detriment of the copyright owner since, but for
the time-sharing, the copyright owner might have made ten
sales rather than one.
Such use may be deemed infringing by adopting the gloss
already suggested,125 and determining that the copy was not
created for use by a machine with one user. While the result
may seem counter-intuitive since there appears to be only one
copy of the computer program in memory, in practical terms
there are ten copies of the program. They may be discerned
by realizing that the user-variables are an integral part of the
program. Since there are ten user-variables, there are ten dif-
ferent programs running. Although this is a rather subtle ar-
123. This is because of the time spent passing the book from one reader to the
next. In the sequential method, the book is passed 9 times. In the interlace method,
the book will be passed many more times.
124. On the PLATO system at the University of Illinois, for example, up to 400
users may be operating simultaneously without noticeable delays in processing.
125. See supra text accompanying note 121.
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gument, it reflects the economic realities of computer use. As-
sume that Buyer in our example leases time on the time-
sharing machine. If one company with ten terminals uses one
program, the bill to that company will be computed by adding
up the time of each user. Assuming each user was on the sys-
tem for the same length of time, Buyer will receive (10) x (#
time units on system) x (price/time unit). The copyright law
should recognize this fact and give protection to the copyright
owner on the basis of the numbers of potential simultaneous
users.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have suggested in this article that courts should inter-
pret the copyright law as it relates to computer software in
accordance with the economic imbalances justifying protec-
tion of software by copyright. Thus, to the extent allowed by
the statutory and constitutional provisions, courts should not
deny copyright protection to programs in object code format if
the denial would undermine the economic protection which
copyright provides. At the same time, courts should consider
the possibility, on constitutional grounds, that programs
which qualify for patent protection may be ineligible for copy-
right protection since copyright protection would be duplica-
tive and serve no economic need. Further, when determining
whether one program is substantially similar to another,
courts should employ an objective standard that focuses on
the economics of copying. Finally, the "fair use" provisions
must be interpreted so as to protect the copyright owner's le-
gitimate expectation of remuneration for his or her efforts
while, at the same time, protect society's interest in the wide-
spread distribution of ideas.
It is apparent from the legislative history of the 1980
Amendent that the Commission believed that copyright pro-
tection of computer software is a function of economic imbal-
ances. Careful attention to the Final Report will insure that
interpretations of the 1980 Amendment are consonant with its
economic underpinnings. Courts which ignore the legislative
history embodied in the Commission's reports and rely solely
upon the statutory language risk providing protection where it
is not economically necessary and denying protection where
the market-place demands it.
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